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Abstract 
Multiple high-profile instances of anti-Islamic activity in Australia throughout 2015 – for 
example, the Reclaim Australia rallies in April and July, and the establishment of an anti-
Islamic federal political party – is in keeping with increased Islamophobia observed in other 
western nations. While a key driving force behind this phenomenon is the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks in the United States, ongoing jihadi violence – particularly atrocities 
committed by or on behalf of Islamic State –has served to reinforce anti-Islamic sentiment. 
Although objections to Islam are ostensibly cultural and religious, the prejudiced nature of 
Islamophobia essentially operates as racism. Emergent discourses about Islamic culture – for 
example, fears of Sharia law being imposed on western society – have positioned Muslims as 
an “enemy” who endanger western cultural values, and even present an existential threat. 
Accordingly, the risk of violence from anti-Islamic elements is not insignificant. To that end, 
this paper examines the range of security issues arising from Australian Islamophobic activity 
in two parts. First, it provides historical and cultural context for contemporary Islamophobia, 
noting the parallels and overlap with similar movements in the West. The primary themes 
promoted by anti-Islamic groups, and the manner by which they interact with audiences, are 
also analysed, noting the heavy emphasis on online communication, and how this translates to 
offline activities. Second, it will examine the types of potential or actual security risks that 
anti-Islamic activity presents to Australian authorities, describing a spectrum of increasing 
intensity that incorporates communication, physical violence, radicalisation and terrorism. 
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Introduction 
There were several high-profile instances of anti-Islamic activity in Australia 
throughout 2015. Key examples include the Reclaim Australia rallies in April and July, which 
drew large numbers of demonstrators to multiple major cities; anti-mosque protests in 
Bendigo, Victoria organised by right-wing populist group the United Patriots Front (UPF); 
and the establishment of an anti-Islamic political party, the Australian Liberty Alliance, which 
was launched by prominent right-wing Dutch politician Geert Wilders.2 This is in keeping 
with increased Islamophobia observed in other western nations.3 While the underlying driving 
force behind this phenomenon is the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, 
ongoing jihadi violence – particularly atrocities committed by or on behalf of Islamic State – 
has served to reinforce anti-Islamic sentiment.  
Although objections to Islam are ostensibly cultural and religious, the prejudiced 
nature of Islamophobia essentially operates as racism.4 “When we see verbal and other attacks 
against Muslim Australians,” the Australian Race Discrimination Commissioner notes, “it is 
often accompanied by a nastiness and logic that resembles racial hatred.”5 By attaching 
negative signification to Muslims, van der Valk says, Islamophobia “underscores[s] their 
exclusion as ‘the Other’ whilst favouring unequal and discriminatory treatment,” thereby 
producing “culturally oriented racism.”6 Islamophobia should thus be regarded as an 
ideological phenomenon, Allen argues, “manifested in signifiers and symbols that influence, 
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impact on and inform the social consensus about the Other.”7 Emergent discourses about 
Islamic culture – for example, fears of Sharia law being imposed on western society – have 
positioned Muslims as an “enemy” who endanger western cultural values, and even present an 
existential threat. The result, Currie warns, is that “the risk of violence from counter-jihad 
discourse is not inconsiderable, and growing.”8 
To that end, this paper examines the range of security issues arising from 
Islamophobic activity in Australia. It will address these issues in two parts. First, it will 
provide historical and cultural context for contemporary Islamophobia, noting the parallels 
and overlap with similar movements in the West. The primary themes promoted by anti-
Islamic groups, and the manner in which they interact with audiences, will also be analysed, 
noting the heavy emphasis on online communication and how this translates to offline 
activities. Second, it will examine the types of potential or actual security risks that anti-
Islamic activity presents, describing a spectrum of increasing intensity that incorporates 
communication, physical violence, radicalisation and terrorism.  
 
1.1 Social and historical context 
Although ethno-centrist racism has been a perpetual feature in the Australian political 
landscape – prominently represented by the White Australia Policy that governed migrant 
intakes for much of the 20th century – it was only in recent decades that a “more radical form 
of applied patriotism” began to emerge.9 In response to increased Asian migration in the early 
1980s, right-wing extremist groups proliferated by acting as “the little man’s mouthpiece” and 
targeting migrant communities to the point of violence.10 Radical action against 
“Asianisation” persisted into the 1990s with the emergence of extreme right-wing political 
parties such as One Nation.11 
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Australian Muslims had already experienced periods of heightened discrimination 
prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, including the 1990-91 Gulf War, moral panic over 
Lebanese gang activity, and Muslim asylum seekers being labelled “queue jumpers.”12 
Accordingly, Poynting and Mason contend that “the upsurge of anti-Arab racism and 
Islamophobia [after September 11] arose...from the exacerbation of existing tendencies.”13 
The attacks served as “ideological payout” for groups who had presented Islam as 
incompatible with Australian society and cultural values.14 This viewpoint is carried into 
contemporary Islamophobic discourse, which frequently presents Muslims as subhuman, 
depraved and deceptive (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Comments on the Aussie Infidels group Facebook page, October 201515 
 
The social “demonization” of Australian Muslims has, on one hand, means that 
existing extreme right-wing groups have shifted their focus from “traditional” enemies 
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(particularly Jewish people) to Muslims.16 On the other hand, it has produced heightened 
levels of nationalistic social identity within the general Australian community. A recent study 
by Fozdar et al, for example, notes very low levels of positivity towards Australian Muslims, 
and describes the increasingly overt and prolific manner in which the Australian flag is 
displayed.17 These displays, which range from the mundane (eg. car bumper stickers) to the 
extreme (eg. young men who forced non-white attendees at the 2007 Sydney Big Day Out 
concert to kiss the flag), demonstrate that “the flag appears to have come to represent, to some 
Australians, an identity associated with the majority culture and race, and exclusive of 
difference.”18  
While Australia is a highly multicultural society, and a generally inclusive one at that, 
James notes that “beneath the affable surface there exist persistent racist and other forms of 
intolerance that provide the oxygen for selective violence.”19 A key example is a December 
2005 incident where large numbers of whites descended on Cronulla beach, ostensibly as a 
display of patriotism and solidarity, but also to seek violent retribution after a lifeguard was 
allegedly attacked by Lebanese men. The Cronulla riots, Bliuc et al argue, “represent 
evidence of the crystallization in Australian society of a group that sought to maintain the 
supremacy of the European Australian majority.”20 A decade later, the “white civil uprising” 
at Cronulla continues to serve as a touchstone for anti-Islamic activity.21  
 
1.2 Australian anti-Islamic groups and themes 
Contemporary anti-Islamic activity in Australia does not form a homogenous 
movement; rather, it incorporates a disparate spectrum of participants. It encompasses 
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unaligned individuals, populist groups (eg. UPF, Patriots Defence League Australia), pro-
Israel organisations (eg. Q Society), issue-based lobbyists (eg. Halal Choices, local mosque 
opposition groups), Christian ministries (eg. Catch the Fire), neo-Nazi gangs (eg. Combat 18) 
and political parties (eg. Australian Liberty Alliance, Rise Up Australia Party). Several federal 
politicians have also expressed Islamophobic sentiments, such as Senator Jacqui Lambie’s 
push to outlaw burqas, or MP George Christensen’s address at a Reclaim Australia rally.22 
There is marked overlap between anti-Islamic entities – for example, the Australian Liberty 
Alliance and Halal Choices emerged from the Q Society, and the anti-mosque group Rights 
For Bendigo Residents coordinated protest activity with the UPF. Conflict between – and 
fragmentation within – groups has also emerged. While the Islamophobic movement contains 
a wide range of viewpoints and agendas, Aly nevertheless identifies a number of common 
themes that have flourished unchecked in an “enabling environment” of mainstream political 
intolerance.23   
A prominent theme among anti-Islamic groups – both in Australia and the broader 
western world – is that European historical and cultural heritage is under threat from 
“Islamification.” For example, Kundanini notes the “civilisational discourse” promoted by the 
English Defence League (EDL), a populist Islamophobic group formed in 2009, which 
describes Islam as incompatible with western traditions such as individual liberty, freedom of 
speech and gender equality.24 This “identitarian narrative” presents a struggle against the 
social erosion brought about by multicultural policies of weak and complicit western 
governments.25 These views are echoed by the Party For Freedom, a Sydney-based political 
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organisation that derides the “multicultural treason” of successive governments, and seeks to 
halt Muslim immigration: 
Sharia Law, with its denigration and mistreatment of women and non-Muslims, is 
incompatible with the Australian way of life and secular, legal traditions. Certain cultural 
practices associated with Muslim populations, such as FGM (female genital mutilation), 
honour killings and polygamy, are also unacceptable and unwanted in Australia.26 
 
In its most extreme form, this oppositional narrative conjures a modern-day Crusade, 
where the West battling to survive against Islam, even struggling to prevent the systematic 
genocide of whites. In an Australian context, this wartime discourse is reinforced by recurrent 
references to “the ANZAC spirit” by anti-Islamic groups and their followers (see Figure 2). 
ANZAC soldiers are revered for having fought against the Ottoman Empire, a potent 
historical symbol of the Islamic Caliphate, while serving as an archetype for noble and brave 
Australians. Similarly, the EDL has constructed a “heroic narrative” around its actions by 
adopting wartime symbols and metaphors to present itself as a vanguard against Islamic 
hostility, while also reinforcing comradeship within the group.27  
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Figure 2: Images circulated on social media by [clockwise from top left] Australians Against 
Islam, Aussie Infidels, and Patriots Defence League Australia28 
This sense of anti-Islamic comradeship is aided in large part by online activity, 
particularly social media platforms that facilitate peer-to-peer communication. In September 
2015, the author identified no less than 30 Australian Islamophobic Facebook pages, a tally 
that excludes pages representing established anti-Islamic groups and political parties. Easily 
accessible, broadly appealing online material can help an extremist movement gain followers, 
while serving as an “echo chamber” that reinforces an individual’s ideology.29 The internet, 
Koehler notes, “is especially suitable for the quick creation, adaption and distribution of 
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[symbolic] frames and is thereby thought to play a central role in building and maintaining the 
group’s collective identity.”30  
Virtual interconnectedness not only builds a collective identity within – and among – 
domestic groups, it also promotes transnational solidarity.31 Accordingly, a “united global 
struggle” narrative can be witnessed among Islamophobic groups, largely resulting from 
ubiquitous online connectivity.32 For example, the Q Society has closely collaborated with 
US-based group Stop Islamization of Nations.33Likewise, Arizona-based Jon Ritzheimer 
organised the October 2015 “Global Rally For Humanity,” an international day of anti-Islamic 
protest with supporters in North America, Europe and Australia.34 In a Facebook video 
announcing the protest, Ritzheimer makes specific reference to the UPF: “Our boys down in 
Australia, United Patriot [sic] Front, we here in America…are honoured to have this 
opportunity to stand with you against a common enemy.”35 The UPF replied with a video 
declaring, “America, you’re our allies, so are England. Doesn’t matter whether it’s troops...or 
the citizens. You’re our allies, we’ve got each other’s backs.”36 
Although the “Global Rally For Humanity” ultimately attracted low turnouts, it 
nevertheless points to the influence that the online sphere can wield in offline activities. An 
annual “Counterjihad” conference in Europe, for example, was founded in 2007 by online 
activists and bloggers.37Following an August 2015 protest against a mosque in Bendigo, the 
UPF declared it would hold a second demonstration if its Facebook video was shared more 
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than 1000 times.38 The internet can serve as “a permanent gateway to offline political 
activism,” Koehler notes, which allows would-be supporters to sample a range of group 
ideologies before committing to real world activism.39  
Thus the internet can potentially also lead to more extreme real-world behaviour. An 
individual may internalise a group’s online narrative to explain a complex world, develop 
self-esteem, and merge the group’s ideology into their social identity.40 This results in a 
scenario, Barrelle says, where the individual “clearly knows who is good and who is bad 
(based on in-group/out-group membership), and will fight ‘the enemy’ for himself, his 
comrades and in the name of his righteous cause.”41 In other words, online material can serve 
to radicalise an individual, which may manifest in real-world extremist behaviour – including 
violence. This phenomenon will be addressed in greater detail in the following section. 
 
2. Security issues arising from anti-Islamic activity 
Anti-Islamic activity can be viewed as an escalating spectrum of actual and potential 
security risks, with incremental impact on public safety. The lower intensity end of this 
spectrum is represented by anti-social activity, and it progresses into moderate intensity 
activity with wider public impact. At the higher intensity level, anti-Islamic activity can lead 
to radicalisation, with the potential to result in violence, including backlash from the Muslim 
community.  
 
2.1 Low intensity activity 
As previously noted, Islamophobia essentially functions as racism. The Australian Human 
Rights Commission identifies harassment as “a component of racist violence” that 
encompasses “behaviour intended to intimidate or threaten the victim.”42 Notable Australian 
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examples of low-intensity Islamophobia between November 2014 and November 2015 
include: 
 Multiple instances of Muslim Australians being verbally attacked on public transport43 
 Intimidating letters posted to a Melbourne-based Muslim academic44 
 A mutilated pig carcass being placed outside a Perth mosque45 
 Multiple instances of mosques being subject to vandalism46 
 UPF social media videos depicting group members visiting mosques and staging a 
mock beheading47 
The immediate impact of these examples is localised, in the form of adverse psychological 
repercussions for the victim or worshippers at a particular mosque. However, these activities 
also produce a wider feeling of insecurity among Muslim Australians. In response to an 
apparent increase in harassment, an Islamophobia Register was privately established in 
September 2014 to collate anti-Islamic activity, with its founder noting: “The anxiety felt by 
victims...[has] detrimental impacts on all aspects of their lives and the broader families and 
communities.”48  
To that end, Kundanini observes the political nature of racially motivated attacks may 
warrant terroristic categorisation, as “low-level harassment...inflicts a different but no less 
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powerful form of terror,”49 while Lambert argues that it is insufficient to describe low-
intensity attacks on Muslims as “hate crimes,” which should instead be regarded as political 
violence.50 Even low-intensity activities such as harassment and property damage can be 
regarded as “a close cousin to terrorism,” according to Krueger and Malečková, as targeting is 
based on group identity, and the resultant effect “wreak[s] terror on a greater number of 
people than those directly affected by the violence.”51 This assertion has not gone 
unchallenged; for example, Deloughery et al’s empirical study of hate crime and terrorism 
found “no association or negative association between the two,” which leads the authors to 
conclude that “the two behaviors are conceptually unique and likely driven by different social 
processes.”52  
Even so, the Australian Government identifies low-intensity activity, including minor 
criminal activity, as a point of concern due to the fact it may represent the early stages of an 
individual becoming radicalised.53 This notion is contested by Deloughery et al, who present 
evidence that hate crimes against minority groups are reactionary, rather than a precursor to 
further radical activity or outright terrorism.54 It is worth noting the case of Oklahoma City 
bomber Timothy McVeigh here, however. In the years leading up to the 1995 attack on a US 
federal government building, McVeigh engaged in increasingly provocative communication 
directed at US authorities, while his criminal activity escalated to include trespass and theft 
from a military facility, and conspiring in the armed robbery of a firearm dealer. 55  
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2.2 Moderate intensity activity 
At this point in this spectrum, anti-Islamic activity presents a wider threat to general 
public safety, imposing greater economic and social costs, including property damage and 
injury. This includes, for example, an April 2015 arson attack on a mosque in Toowoomba, 
Queensland.56 Anti-Islamic public demonstrations throughout 2015 also fall into this 
category. Although these demonstrations are a legally-sanctioned exercise in public protest, 
the inconvenience they present can impose economic costs: a UPF rally in October 2015, for 
example, led to the cancellation of a Bendigo wine festival.57  
A large police presence may be required at anti-Islamic demonstrations, which diverts 
policing assets from general public safety duties, while also leading to the costly deployment 
of specialised resources such as air, mounted and tactical units.58 The police presence results 
from the strong potential for violence. For example, multiple attacks on Lebanese people 
during the 2005 Cronulla riot required police intervention, while capsicum spray was 
deployed to quell unruly UPF supporters and opponents in August 2015.59  
Noting similar unrest at EDL rallies, Busher describes how the demonstrations “seem 
to provide an outlet for violence, and an opportunity for marginalized (often young) men to 
enact an aggressive masculinity directed towards...the ‘dangerous Other.’”60 Furthermore, 
violence serves as evidence of an individual’s deepening engagement with extremist 
ideology.61 As the Australian Government notes, “If someone begins to support the use of 
violence to promote a cause, radicalisation to violent extremism becomes a serious 
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concern.”62 There is also evidence that neo-Nazi groups targeted Reclaim Australia rallies to 
recruit new members (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Neo-Nazi “Stormfront” forum users discuss Reclaim Australia, February 201563 
 
2.3 High intensity activity 
At this end of the scale, anti-Islamic activity presents a serious threat to public safety, 
with the potential to conduct – or provoke – violence that results in significant social and 
economic costs, multiple casualties, or even fatalities. Acts of this nature are undertaken by 
individuals who progressively internalise an extremist ideology to the point of radicalisation, 
with Bartlett and Miller observing a number of different models describing this process.64 
While radicalisation in itself is not problematic, Barrelle says, it can lead to terrorism under 
the right conditions.65 Likewise, Bjørgo notes that most people with extremist views will not 
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undertake terrorism, but “certain events and developments may provide circumstances for 
radicalizing some groups and individuals to cross this threshold.”66 
Extremist violence may be directly undertaken by a group, or by an otherwise 
unaffiliated individual who is nevertheless inspired by a group’s ideology. Lambert, for 
example, notes how far-right British organisations “have had a considerable influence in 
promoting racist violence carried out by ‘lone wolves.’”67 In this regard, the internet serves a 
central role in the radicalisation process. Online engagement with anti-Islamic groups can lead 
a person to reject mainstream media in favour of “esoteric sources of information such as the 
various ‘counter-jihad’ blogs and web forums.”68 As noted, this can serve to reinforce a 
person’s inherent biases, and further augment radicalisation.69 A key case study is the 
perpetrator of the July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway, Anders Breivik, who was a devoted 
reader of anti-Islamic blogs such as “Gates of Vienna” to the point that he plagiarised these 
websites in his manifesto.70  
It is important at this point to distinguish between the state and non-state entities that 
might be targeted by extremist violence. Anti-Islamic activists view Muslims as the primary 
threat to Australian society, but as noted, many also believe the government is complicit in 
supporting this threat through multicultural policies (see Figure 4). This phenomenon is 
termed “split delegitimization” by Sprinzak, a staged process in which a right-wing group 
increasingly conflates the actions of a government with those of its primary enemy.71 In the 
final stage, any person identified as complicit is “derogated into the ranks of the worst 
enemies or subhuman species,” which “makes it possible for the radicals to disengage morally 
and to commit atrocities without remorse.”72 Sprinzak’s theory has, however, received 
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criticism for its “vague concepts, shaky assumptions...and empirical inaccuracies.”73 A 
database examining contemporary right wing activity in Germany, for example, indicates that 
government facilities and personnel have consistently been a major target for right wing 
terrorism, rather than an adjunct to a campaign against ‘the Other’ as posited by Sprinzak’s 
theory.74 Even so, the fact remains that in many instances, right-wing extremists view 
government authorities and an ethno-religious “enemy” as two sides of the same coin – for 
example, right wing militias in the US, and their misgivings about the US government’s 
supposed role within a grand Zionist conspiracy.  
Again, Breivik serves as a critical case study in this regard, as his decision to attack 
government and left-wing targets was motivated by perceived betrayal in the face of a 
European-wide “civil war” against Islam.75 While Breivik did consider directly striking 
Muslim and immigrant targets, he was concerned about stirring public sympathy and the 
consequent “counter-productive effect” it might have had, ultimately leading him to attack 
what he perceived to be complicit enemies.76 Despite his apparent reluctance to inflict large 
numbers of civilian casualties (particularly children), they ultimately accounted for the vast 
majority of his victims.77 “As a result of their ideological beliefs,” Drake notes, “terrorists 
often seek to identify their victims as being in some way deserving of the treatment meted out 
to them.”78 In other words, Breivik’s anti-Islamic ideology shifted blame for the attacks onto 
the victims, who he deliberately targeted as supposed enablers of a grand “cultural Marxist” 
conspiracy.   
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Figure 4: UPF Facebook post, September 2015 
It is not only the actions of anti-Islamic groups or individuals that present a potential 
security concern for Australian authorities, however. A similar “blame shifting” dynamic can 
be seen as part of jihadi attacks on Western civilian targets, ostensibly in retribution for their 
democratic support of oppressive policies in Muslim nations. The Australian Government 
thus warns of the phenomenon of “reactive group radicalisation,” a spiralling feedback 
process where one group’s actions inform and influence another’s, and vice-versa.79 This 
process was first described by Eatwell, who denoted British Muslim push-back against right-
wing violence as “cumulative extremism – namely, the way in which one form of extremism 
can feed off and magnify other forms.”80 Cumulative extremism is demonstrated in a 
Facebook post by a young Muslim Australian man who warned of violent retribution in 
response to the “Global Rally For Humanity” (see Figure 5).  
Busher and Macklin rightly point out that “hard talk is not the name as action...[or] 
intent to cause physical harm,” and that over-application of the cumulative extremism concept 
may amplify the apocalyptic narrative of extremist groups.81 Furthermore, a discussion of the 
risk of high-level security threats in Australia should be placed in the appropriate context. 
Putting aside the contentious hate crime/terrorism nexus, there is only sporadic precedent for 
serious right-wing terrorism in Australia; a Christian extremist’s firearm attack on a 
Melbourne abortion clinic in 2001 serves as the sole example of a lethal right-wing terrorist 
operation in recent years.82 Meanwhile, recent Islamist attacks – for example, a fatal siege in 
central Sydney in December 2014, and the murder of a NSW Police Force employee in 
October 2015 – have thus far been extremely limited in scope and impact.  
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Nevertheless, there is ample evidence to support the idea that extremist actions – 
particularly violence – can produce a dangerous loop of escalating activity.83 At the very least, 
there is frequently an observable spike in right wing hate crimes committed in the immediate 
wake of an Islamist terrorist attack.84 For example, in the two weeks following the November 
2015 jihadist attacks in Paris, the Islamophobia Register reported a significant increase in 
verbal and online harassment incidents towards Australian Muslims.85 In addition, a UPF 
supporter who declared on social media that “we are the enemy [of Islam], and the people of 
Paris are the latest victim” was arrested in November 2015 for possessing prohibited 
weapons; a police search of his home located documents related to the manufacture of 
explosives.86  
 
Conclusion 
As in other western nations, Anti-Islamic activity in Australia markedly increased 
following the September 11 attacks, and there is evidence that it continues to gain momentum 
and evolve. Several populist groups and movements emerged in Australia during 2015, while 
existing far-right groups have reconfigured their “enemy” framework towards Muslims. 
Islamophobia has also entered mainstream politics, most notably with the foundation of the 
Australian Liberty Alliance, though the full impact of this phenomenon will not be borne out 
until the 2016 federal election. At the same time, high-profile international events will 
continue to heighten western misgivings surrounding the Muslim identity. Incidents such as 
the numerous alleged sexual assaults by Muslim asylum seekers in Germany on New Year’s 
Eve 2015, or violent atrocities linked to Islamic State – including “inspired” acts like the 
December 2015 mass shooting at a public servant function in California – will only serve to 
further feed the vitriol espoused by Australian anti-Islamic groups. 
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Anti-Islamic activity presents a spectrum of security threats that need to be proactively 
addressed by Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies, though it has 
unquestionably been earmarked as an issue of concern;  a senior NSW Police Force 
representative, for instance, noted in mid-2015 that “there is definitely activity on the extreme 
right wing of politics...We are not taking our eye off that.”87 The Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) also notes that right-wing activity “could have a bearing on 
Australia’s security environment in the future,” but assesses a low likelihood of violence.88 
This is in keeping with James’ observation that ASIO has reduced its interest in right-wing 
extremism to concentrate primarily on jihadist activity.89 Weak anti-vilification legislation, 
and shortcomings in police cultural training, mean that Australian police often have “an 
unsophisticated grasp of the challenges faced by communities vulnerable to hate; as a 
consequence, there is ‘underpolicing’ of hate crimes.”90  
It is therefore important for government officials acknowledge that even low-intensity 
anti-Islamic activity, such as harassment and vandalism, is a form of political violence; by 
doing so, Lambert argues, “it will help to ensure that adequate and commensurate resources 
are devoted to the threat.”91 There does not appear to be a public database of hate crimes 
conducted against Muslim Australians (as compared, for example, to the annual Hate Crime 
Statistics report produced by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation). Instead, these statistics 
are privately compiled by Islamophobia Register based on voluntary reporting by victims. 
Public broadcast of anti-Islamic hate crime statistics may be a useful way to present the issue 
in ‘black and white’ and inspire open debate within policymaking domains, which could in 
turn provide reassurance to the Muslim community that their wellbeing is of active concern to 
Australian officials. On the other hand, such statistics may also provide the radical fringe 
element within this community with evidence to support a narrative of systemic vilification.  
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Moderate-intensity Islamophobic activity seems likely to increase as populist groups, most 
notably the UPF, transition their online presence to offline activism, with resultant public 
disorder. As a point in case, buoyed by the perceived success of its rallies in Bendigo, the 
UPF staged a demonstration in Perth, Western Australia, in late November 2015, with a view 
to expanding its activities nationwide.92 These events help anti-Islamic groups gain 
mainstream media prominence and garner additional supporters, with the potential to attract 
or motivate individuals who may be susceptible to heightened radicalisation. Although high-
level activity is thus far absent in Australia, the 2011 Norway attacks and an October 2015 
incident in Sweden highlight the potential for serious anti-Islamic violence.93 The established 
threat of local jihadi activity, meanwhile, may only be amplified by the provocative rhetoric 
and actions of the anti-Islamic movement.  
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Figure 5: Facebook post re: “Global Rally For Humanity” announcement, August 2015 
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